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TRADE
This article examines the issue of climate change policy and international trade law.
While conventional wisdom may have predicted that conflicts in trade law would emerge
through climate-related protectionist measures, such as carbon tariffs on imports from
countries with less stringent controls on greenhouse gas emissions, the authors point out
that government support for climate-friendly technologies has in fact emerged as the primary battleground. The authors examine two recent disputes—between the United States
and China and between Japan and Canada—over green subsidies and their implications for
the future of clean energy.
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limate change is poised to become the next big
thing in international trade law, but not for the
reason most experts have long predicted. The
much-ballyhooed ‘‘border carbon adjustment,’’ a controversial tariff imposed on imports to level the playing
field between trading partners with strong climate regulations and those without, has yet to be employed anywhere in the world. Meanwhile, clean energy subsidies
have already generated World Trade Organization
(WTO) disputes, the resolution of which likely will
shape important features of international climate policy
and the world trading system for years to come.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, then, it is not
climate-related protectionism but rather government
support for climate-friendly technology that has come
into conflict with international trade law. This article
identifies the reasons why protectionism has yielded to
subsidies as the primary climate change battleground at
the WTO, and examines the key issues in two recently
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2
initiated trade disputes with potentially enormous ramifications for the future of clean energy.

Climate-Related Protectionism: The Dog That
Didn’t Bite
For years, climate and trade law experts have been
worried that taxes on carbon dioxide emissions and
cap-and-trade rules might generate international disputes at the WTO or, worse, outright trade wars between the world’s leaders and laggards in climate regulation.1 Because a lack of greenhouse gas emissions
controls can, like an artificially deflated currency, make
one country’s exports cheaper vis-à-vis a trading partner that has its own domestic climate regulations, some
price adjustment at the border may be deemed necessary to level the playing field. The idea is that by using
a tariff to ‘‘adjust’’ the price of imported goods, known
as a border carbon adjustment (BCA), a country with an
emissions cap or carbon tax would be able to prevent a
flood of cheap, carbon-intense imports from displacing
domestic production, eroding its terms of trade, and undoing the effectiveness of its climate regulations
through so-called ‘‘carbon leakage.’’ 2 A crude BCA
measure featured prominently in the failed WaxmanMarkey climate legislation passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives in June 2009.3 Likewise, although not
implemented, proposals for BCAs in Europe and Australia have gained support among particularly tradeexposed interest groups.4
But, the argument goes, the failure by a climate laggard, such as the United States,5 to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions across its entire economy creates an un1
See, e.g., Ben Lockwood and John Whalley, Carbonmotivated Border Tax Adjustments: Old Wine in Green
Bottles?, 33 WORLD ECON. 810 (2010); Alexandra Khrebtukova,
Using National Border Climate Adjustment Schemes to Facilitate Global Greenhouse Gas Management in Industrial Production, 1 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENVI. 107 (2010);
Arvind Subramanian, et al., Reconciling Climate Change and
Trade Policy, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
WORKING PAPER NO. 09-15, (December 10, 2009); Christian Pitschas, GATT/WTO Rules for Border Tax Adjustment and the
Proposed European Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 479
(1995).
2
See Francesco Sindico, The EU and Carbon Leakage:
How to Reconcile Border Adjustments with the WTO?, 17 EUR.
ENERGY & ENV’L. L. REV. 328 (2008).
3
See American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA),
H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) §§ 766-67.
4
See, e.g., E.U. Commission, Draft Directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC – Future Allowance Import Requirement
(FAIR); Svetlana German, ‘‘Climate Change Legislation in
Australia: Trade Exposed Industries Mounting a Strong Resistance,’’ Columbia Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia
Law School, May 3, 2011, http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/
climatechange/2011/05/03/climate-change-legislation-inaustralia-trade-exposed-industries-mounting-a-strongresistance.
5
The United States remains one of the world’s highest
emitters of greenhouse gases on a per capita basis and is the
second highest emitter on an aggregate basis, after China, but
has thus far failed to implement a comprehensive regulatory
scheme to curb emissions. See Fiona Harvey, ‘‘Ailing UN climate talks jolted by record surge in greenhouse gases,’’ THE
GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 29, 2011 (‘‘While the EU is on track to
meet its [Kyoto Protocol] commitments, other countries are
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fair cost differential across practically all categories of
imports to a climate leader, such as the European
Union,6 from steel and concrete to high-tech consumer
goods. Unless crafted with exceeding specificity, a BCA
could thus apply to a wide swath of imported products.7
For this reason, many experts worry that the unilateral
imposition of BCAs might spark escalating trade wars
by disguising crass protectionism beneath a thin veneer
of climate-friendly rhetoric.8 Although the WTO itself
has confirmed the potential legality of at least some
BCA measures,9 the potential for abuse remains, especially since political realities likely will hamstring policymakers who seek to ensure that narrow BCA measures comply with the requirements imposed by international trade law.
Nevertheless, it is important to recall that much of
the distress about climate-related protectionism has
been driven by expectations about two eventualities
that have yet to come to pass: the conclusion of a binding international treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol
after its first commitment period expires in 2012, and
the passage by the U.S. Congress of comprehensive climate change legislation.
Had the United States and other developed countries
joined Europe in embracing binding caps on greenhouse gas emissions, the need to strike the right balance between climate change mitigation and industrial
competitiveness would have almost certainly led to the
embrace of BCAs in one form or another. Indeed, as
noted above, powerful trade-exposed interest groups
secured a broad BCA provision in the Waxman-Markey
legislation passed by the House in advance of the 2009
climate change summit in Copenhagen,10 and inserted
a comparable measure in at least one of the companion
climate bills introduced in the Senate that same year.11
not and some – including the US, which opposes Kyoto –
would prefer to discuss a replacement.’’).
6
Id.
7
This analysis ignores the possibility of a sectoral approach
to greenhouse gas regulation, as appears to be taking shape in
China. Indeed, a rough version of sectoral greenhouse gas permitting was included as part of the Chinese government’s 12th
Five-Year Plan. See Deborah Seligsohn and Angel Tsu, ‘‘How
Does China’s 12th Five-Year Plan Address Energy and the
Environment?,’’ World Resources Institute, March 7, 2011,
http://www.wri.org/stories/2011/03/how-does-chinas-12th-fiveyear-plan-address-energy-and-environment.
8
See ‘‘Obama Criticises Border Tax Adjustments in House
Climate Bill,’’ International Centre for Trade & Sustainable
Development,
July
1,
2009,
http://ictsd.org/i/news/
bridgesweekly/49962.
9
In a joint report published with the United Nations Environment Program in July 2009, the WTO stated unequivocally
that at least certain types of climate-motivated border adjustments could pass muster under relevant trade law rules. See
World Trade Organization, Press Release, ‘‘WTO and UNEP
Launch a Report Explaining for the First Time the Connections
Between Trade and Climate Change,’’ June 26, 2009, http://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr559_e.htm. Furthermore, some scholars have argued persuasively that reformatting BCAs so that they are origin-neutral and assessed at the
point of market access would not only help to avoid trade law
problems but might also incentivize rapid development of new
forms of international climate collaboration. See, e,g., Khrebtukova, supra note 1.
10
See ACESA §§ 766-67, supra note 3.
11
See American Power Act, Discussion Draft, 111th Cong.
(2010), §§ 776-77, available at http://kerry.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/APAbill3.pdf.
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But without federal climate legislation driving up the
cost of greenhouse gas emissions, U.S. policymakers
have less reason to worry about the international competitiveness of high-emitting domestic industries.12 And
Europeans have by and large forsworn BCAs, recognizing that, at least for now, the risks of a nasty trade war
outweigh the benefits.13
China, meanwhile, is moving ahead with a variety of
climate and energy measures under its 12th Five-Year
Plan that, taken together, could effectively impose a
price on greenhouse gas emissions. While the irony is
likely not lost on its leaders, chances are slim indeed
that China, with so much to gain from free trade, would
ever impose a BCA on goods imported from the United
States. At least for the time being, then, climate-related
protectionism has receded as an issue of primary concern for the world’s major trading partners.
The same cannot be said for climate-friendly ‘‘clean
tech’’ subsidies, which have generated two companion
WTO disputes in recent months. One case, between the
United States and China, tackles Chinese programs to
help domestic wind turbine manufacturers, while the
other, between Japan and Canada, deals primarily with
Canadian support for locally produced solar photovoltaic panels. While ostensibly addressing different industries in the developing and developed worlds, respectively, taken together the cases appear more like two
sides of the same coin. Both highlight a range of potential conflicts—and opportunities for coordination—
between climate mitigation measures and the requirements of international trade law.

DS419: Writing the Rules of the Game for
Clean Energy Subsidies
Skyrocketing growth in China’s wind energy sector is
one of the most significant recent developments in the
global effort to curb climate change. Since China is the
world’s top emitter of greenhouse gases and remains
heavily dependent on coal-fired electricity generation,14
the emergence of a vibrant Chinese clean-tech industry
not only promises to generate benefits for that country’s citizens but is also likely to yield significant spillover effects for the rest of the world.15 Most significantly, Chinese wind power will lead to lower aggregate
global greenhouse gas emissions than would otherwise
occur under a business-as-usual scenario. And because
of China’s vast economies of scale, the growth of a robust wind industry there also will facilitate the dissemination of cheaper clean-technology products world12
In fact, a persuasive case can be made that certain industries already are benefiting, as compared with their European
competitors, from the lack of a carbon price in the United
States.
13
An important exception appears to be the European
Union’s new rules for including carbon emissions associated
with international aviation in its Emissions Trading System.
Such rules have already sparked challenges by some U.S. airline companies, with Chinese companies threatening similar
action, possibly at the WTO. See (129 DEN A-2, 7/6/11).
14
See U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2010: Energy Related Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/ieo/emissions.html.
15
See Daniel Firger, ‘‘What Hu’s Washington Visit Says
About Climate Change,’’ HUFFINGTON POST, January 14, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-firger/hus-washingtonvisit-and-_b_809134.html.
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wide, helping other countries make the much-needed
transition away from fossil fuels.16
Notwithstanding these advantages, China’s support
for domestic wind energy manufacturers has run into
trouble. In December 2010 the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated a dispute
before the WTO alleging that Chinese wind energy subsidies violated international trade law.17 The dispute,
captioned ‘‘DS419,’’ may yet be resolved by the parties,
which are currently consulting amicably with each
other. Nevertheless, the simple fact that the United
States has chosen to file a complaint with the WTO on
this subject serves as an important signpost in the new
and largely unfamiliar landscape of international trade
in climate-friendly goods and services.
The U.S. complaint, which originated with a petition
by the United Steelworkers Union (USW) under domestic trade law,18 concerns an allegedly ‘‘prohibited subsidy’’ under Article 3.1(b) of the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).19 The
USW petition constituted a broad-brushstroke challenge to China’s clean-tech agenda, making a number
of claims concerning not only ‘‘prohibited’’ subsidies
under Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement,20 but also ‘‘actionable’’ subsidies under Articles 5 and 6, as well as
discrimination against imported goods under Article
III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of
1994 (GATT) and paragraph 3(a) of China’s Protocol of
Accession to the WTO.21 In contrast, the U.S. request
for consultations is much narrower in scope. Its exclusive focus is a set of domestic content requirements, in
a particular program of the Chinese central government, which makes subsidies conditional upon the use
of parts domestically produced in China and therefore
allegedly violates Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.22
At first blush, DS419 seems to be about finding an answer to a relatively simple question: whether certain
Chinese subsidies for wind power violate specific provisions of international trade law. But the facts and legal
arguments at issue in DS419 make sense only in context; and understanding the context out of which this
16

Id.
Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment, Request
for Consultations (U.S.-China), WT/DS419/1, Dec. 22, 2010,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds419_
e.htm. See also Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Press Release, ‘‘United States Requests WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations on China’s Subsidies for Wind
Power Equipment Manufacturers,’’ Dec. 22, 2010, http://
www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/
december/united-states-requests-wto-dispute-settlement-con;
and (245 DEN A-5, 12/23/10).
18
United Steelworkers, Press Release, ‘‘USW Files Trade
Case to Preserve Clean, Green Manufacturing Jobs in
America,’’ Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.usw.org/media_center/
releases_advisories?id=0327.
19
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 14.
20
Id.
21
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187, 33 ILM 1153 (1994);
Accession of the People’s Republic of China - Decision of Nov.
10, 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
acc_e/completeacc_e.htm.
22
See USTR, supra note 17.
17
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dispute arises requires us to keep at least three distinct
realities in mind.
First, there is the reality of climate change. The
planet already is experiencing melting of arctic sea ice
and low-latitude glaciers, more severe and frequent
storms, dangerous heat waves, desertification, and sea
level rise.23 These climate impacts are affecting the
lives of millions of people, many of whom are among
the least able to adapt to the environmental changes
afoot. From citizens of small island states facing the
prospect of disappearing homelands to indigenous
tribal communities above the Arctic Circle confronted
with vanishing fish and game upon which traditional
livelihoods depend, climate change has begun to wreak
havoc for the most vulnerable members of humankind.
Carbon dioxide levels today are higher than at any time
during the past 800,000 years, and probably for much
longer,24 and 2010 is tied as one of the warmest years
in recorded history.25
The international community, including the United
States and China, agreed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
1992, endorsing its goal of avoiding ‘‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’’ 26 To
achieve this, the world’s pre-eminent body on climate
science, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), has warned that global temperature
rise must be constrained to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above the pre-industrial average.27 In
order to have just a 50 percent chance of hitting this target, the IPCC has concluded that atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide must be kept below 450 parts
per million.28 Meeting these targets, which the international community explicitly agreed to at the 2009 Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen and the 2010 COP in Cancún,29 will require a major increase in the use of renewable rather than fossil
sources of energy.
Yet emissions, particularly from China and much of
the rest of the developing world, are growing fast.
Sometime in 2007, China overtook the United States to
become the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse

gases.30 In 2009, the most recent year for which figures
are available, Chinese carbon dioxide emissions had
risen to one-quarter above U.S. emissions and were
nearly double the total emissions from all of the European Union’s 27 member states.31 Notably, while China’s installed capacity for wind energy skyrocketed
from just 346 megawatts in the year 2000 to 16 gigawatts in 2010, a 40-fold increase,32 wind power still provides less than 1 percent of the nation’s electricity generation.33 By comparison, 71 percent of China’s electricity comes from coal, the most polluting fossil fuel.34
And China’s use of coal is soaring. In less than four
years China has moved from having a rough balance
between its coal imports and exports, to becoming a voracious importer of coal from around the world, including the United States.35 It is of course worth recalling,
especially in the context of international trade, that
roughly one-quarter of China’s emissions are directly
related to the production of goods for export, not domestic consumption.36
This brings us to a second reality, China’s status as a
developing economy. As recently as the year 2000, China’s per capita gross domestic product stood at $1,000,
as compared to $35,000 in the United States.37 Even today, China’s GDP per capita is still just $3,700, while
the U.S. figure is over 12 times greater.38 Indeed, for all
the talk of China’s skyrocketing growth and clean tech
prowess, it is useful to recall that hundreds of millions
of people in rural China still rely upon straw and wood
for household heating and cooking, and have little or no
access to electricity. So even as the world’s leading
emitter, China’s per capita emissions are still just onethird those of the United States.39 Furthermore, China
is responsible for just a small share of the world’s cumulative (historical) emissions. From 1850 to 2006, by
one count, China contributed just 8.6 percent of the total, as compared to 29 percent for the United States and
27 percent for the European Union.40
The political imperative to raise its citizens’ living
standards and grow its economy, combined with the
historical fact of its very recent rise as a world power,
helps to explain the Chinese government’s approach to

23
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment, available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/
publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_
report.htm (Fourth Assessment Report).
24
Throughout most of human history, carbon dioxide concentrations were at 280 parts per million. As of March 2011,
the figure stood at 392 parts per million. Mauna Loa Observatory, Earth System Research Laboratory, Global Monitoring
Division, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, http://
www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/.
25
NOAA, 2010 Tied for Warmest Year on Record, http://
www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20110112_
globalstats.html.
26
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (opened for signature June 20, 1992, entered into force
1994) (1992) 31 ILM 848 (hereinafter UNFCCC), art. 2.
27
See IPCC, supra note 23.
28
Id.
29
See UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.15 (2009) (hereinafter
‘‘Copenhagen Accord’’), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf; UNFCCC Draft Decision-/
CP.16 (2010) (hereinafter ‘‘Cancún Agreements’’), available at
http://cancun.unfccc.int.

30
U.S. Energy Information Agency, International Emissions Data, http://bit.ly/l5PVEa.
31
Id.
32
See Global Wind Energy Council, China—Total Installed
Capacity, http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=125.
33
U.S. Energy Information Agency, Countries—China,
http://eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.
34
Id.
35
See Rebekah Kebede and Michael Taylor, ‘‘China Coal
Imports to Double in 2015, India Close Behind,’’ REUTERS, May
30, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/30/us-coalasia-idUSTRE74T2Q220110530.
36
Tao Wang and Jim Watson, ‘‘Who Owns China’s Carbon
Emissions?,’’ Tyndall Centre Briefing Note No. 23 (2007), Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Sussex, http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/bn23.pdf.
37
World Bank, World Development Indicators—China,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/china.
38
Id.
39
U.S. Energy Information Agency, International Emissions Data, supra note 30.
40
Friends of the Earth-UK, ‘‘Climate Policies and Action: A
Comparison Between the United States and China,’’ http://
www.foe.co.uk/resource/evidence/china_us_comparison.pdf
(citing data from World Resources Institute, Carbon Analysis
Indicator Tools, available at http://cait.wri.org).
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international climate diplomacy. It also explains China’s broader industrial policy goals, strategies, and tactics. According to a recent analysis published in the
Harvard Business Review, ‘‘Beijing has been quietly
implementing policies to enable China to overtake the
West as the globe’s technology powerhouse.’’ 41
Recognizing the fact that future economic growth
will be driven by high technology (including, notably,
clean technology), China’s leaders have embarked upon
a comprehensive strategy to reduce dependence on imported technologies in key sectors while boosting research and development spending, patent applications,
and innovation.42 Tactics include requiring foreign
companies seeking access to the Chinese market to
form joint ventures with state-owned enterprises, transfer technologies, relocate certain managerial and design functions to Chinese rather than overseas facilities,
and procure a certain percentage of components domestically.43 The allegedly illegal subsidy program at issue in the DS419 dispute is thus clearly part of a much
larger story, one that will shape not only the clean-tech
industry but also the world economy for decades to
come.
A third and final reality is the fact that the U.S.
economy is still recovering slowly—and relatively
joblessly—from a financial crisis and the worst recession since the Great Depression. Among the Obama administration’s key strategies for the recovery have been
so-called ‘‘green jobs,’’ which include manufacturing
jobs building wind turbines, solar panels, and other
clean-tech products.44 Another key element of the
Obama recovery plan has been a new emphasis on exports, with the president in his 2010 State of the Union
speech calling for a National Export Initiative to double
exports by 2014, an increase that he said will support 2
million jobs.45 As part of this effort, the Treasury Department has been working behind the scenes to push
China on currency exchange rate flexibility, which
would make U.S. exports cheaper.46
Complicating all of these initiatives, of course, is the
significant effort in Congress to forestall climate action,
with a slew of new bills introduced since January to roll
back climate initiatives and programs, most prominently Environmental Protection Agency authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases,47
but also budget proposals that would remove a variety
41
Thomas M. Hout and Pankaj Ghemawat, China vs. the
World: Whose Technology Is It?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2010, p.
95.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See (5 DEN A-10, 1/11/10).
45
The White House, Press Release, ‘‘Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,’’ Jan. 27, 2010, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentstate-union-address.
46
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs, ‘‘Report to Congress on International Economic
and Exchange Rate Policies,’’ Feb. 2011, at 12-16, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/
exchange-rate-policies/Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%
20Report%20February%204%202011.pdf.
47
For a comprehensive account of all climate changerelated legislation introduced in the 112th U.S. Congress, see
Columbia Center for Climate Change Law, Climate Legislation
Tracker,
Legislation
Tracker
Guide,
http://
www.law.columbia.edu/centers/climatechange/resources/
legislation; see also BNA’s climate change and clean energy
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of trade-distorting tax breaks and subsidies for the fossil fuel industry.48
While the full factual record in DS419 remains unclear pending additional briefing by the parties, if the
Chinese documents cited in the U.S. request for consultations do indeed require domestic inputs as a condition
for the receipt of subsidies under the challenged program, then a reasonable prima facie case can be made
that China has violated the SCM Agreement.
According to Professor Robert Howse of New York
University School of Law, however, DS419 may push
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body and, ultimately, its
Appellate Body to grapple with some heretofore unanswered questions. Speaking at a public forum on the
dispute convened by the Columbia Center for Climate
Change Law on March 30, 2011,49 Howse said these include whether the exceptions clauses of Article XX of
the GATT are pleadable as a defense to a complaint under the SCM Agreement, which has no analogous provisions and, if so, whether it is possible to justify a measure like the domestic content requirement at issue
here on grounds such as protection of the environment
and conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
Ultimately, the tribunal deciding DS419 (or a future
case like it) may be forced to address the problem of allegedly trade-distorting clean-tech subsidies within the
broader context of a pervasively uneven global energy
marketplace, where enormous government interventions already have tilted the playing field in favor of fossil fuels and away from renewable sources of energy.50
Whatever it decides here, the WTO Appellate Body
likely will help to create new rules of the game for
clean-energy subsidies, affecting not just the United
States and China but much of the rest of the world.

DS412: Japan v. Canada and the Future of
Green Jobs
On Sept. 13, 2010, Japan filed a request for consultations with the WTO in a comparable matter, alleging
that a Canadian provincial law violated key provisions
of the GATT, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).51 Like
DS419, domestic content requirements are at issue in
this dispute, captioned ‘‘DS412,’’ this time in the Province of Ontario’s landmark green energy law.52
The challenged law was designed to guarantee that
local producers—and local jobs—supply a minimum
percentage of the technology used to meet the provlegislation
tracker,
http://climate.bna.com/climate/
tracker.aspx.
48
See (30 DEN A-6, 2/14/11).
49
A video of the complete program is available at http://
www.law.columbia.edu/centers/climatechange/conferences.
50
See ‘‘Green View: How to Save $300 Billion,’’ THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/
newsbook/2010/11/fossil-fuel_subsidies.
51
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Request for Consultations (Japan-Canada),
WT/DS412/1, Sept. 13, 2010, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds412_e.htm.
52
Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009, S.O. 2009,
c. 12 (Can. Ont.), http://www.ontla.on.ca/bills/bills-files/39_
Parliament/Session1/b150ra.pdf; See also (106 DEN A-6,
6/2/11).
BNA
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ince’s ambitious targets for renewable energy generation.53 On the one hand, Ontario hopes to spur investment in homegrown clean-tech jobs by guaranteeing favorable feed-in tariff (FIT) rates for power generators
who purchase solar panels and other equipment produced locally.54 On the other hand, Japan—already the
home
of
several
leading
solar
photovoltaic
manufacturers—seeks to maintain its sizable lead in
clean tech.
The issues in DS412, although similar in some ways
to those of DS419, may have different consequences for
countries like the United States, where policymakers,
like their Canadian counterparts, have at times tried to
link clean-energy mandates with green jobs programs.
If the technologies used to green the American grid
must come from Japan and Denmark (where industries
are well-developed) rather than Michigan and Ohio
(where they may need significant government support
to become cost-competitive), then what is already a
delicate balancing act between climate change mitigation and job creation in the context of economic recovery may prove even harder to maintain. A closer look at
Japan’s three claims against Canada helps to explain
why.
Japan’s first claim rests on Article III.4 of the GATT,
which prohibits discrimination between imported products and ‘‘like products of national origin’’ with respect
to rules and regulations affecting their ‘‘sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.’’55 Under this article, imported goods must be accorded treatment ‘‘no
less favorable’’ than that accorded to goods produced
domestically.56 This principle is known as ‘‘National
Treatment,’’ and an extensive body of WTO case law
could certainly be read to show that domestic origin requirements such as those in Ontario’s FIT program are
illegal under the GATT.
Japan’s submission to the WTO is straightforward,
claiming that the domestic content rules in Ontario’s
new green energy law ‘‘appear to be laws, regulations
or requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use of
equipment for renewable energy generation facilities
that accord less favorable treatment to imported equipment than that accorded to like products originating in
Ontario.’’ 57 To the extent the provincial rules are found
53
See Lee Greenberg, ‘‘Green Energy Has Japan Seeing
Red,’’ OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 14, 2010, available at http://
www.ottawacitizen.com/business/
Green+energy+Japan+seeing/3520596/story.html.
54
See Ontario Power Authority, Renewable Energy Feed-In
Tariff
Program,
http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/what-feedtariff-program.
55
GATT, supra note X, art. III.4.
56
Id.
57
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Request for Consultations (Japan-Canada),
WT/DS412/1, Sept. 16, 2010, at 2, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds412_e.htm.

7-12-11

to discriminate in this manner, they may be held to violate Canada’s commitments under the GATT.
Second, Japan argues that Ontario’s rules violate Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement,58 which requires that
any TRIM applied by Canada must be consistent with
the national treatment rules set out in Article III.4 of the
GATT. Annex 1(a) of the TRIMs Agreement contains an
illustrative list of such prohibited measures, including
those which require ‘‘the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source . . . specified in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production.’’ 59 Again, if the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body finds that Ontario’s
domestic content requirements are indeed couched in
these terms, they too may be struck down.
Finally, Japan points to Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement,60 alleging that Ontario’s FIT program constitutes a prohibited subsidy because it is provided
‘‘contingent . . . upon the use of domestic over imported
goods.’’ 61 If Japan can show that Ontario’s favorable
tariff rates are granted to power producers contingent
upon their use of a certain proportion of renewable energy equipment produced in the province rather than
in, say, Japan, it may prevail on this point too.

Conclusion
Both DS412 and DS419 will take some time to work
their ways through the WTO dispute resolution system.
It is thus far too early to speak conclusively of their
long-term effects on the clean energy and green growth
agenda, not to mention international trade law itself.
But the mere fact that these disputes have been initiated
says something significant about the emerging rules
governing trade in climate-friendly goods and services.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, border carbon adjustment measures and other forms of climate protectionism have yet to materialize as a significant threat to
the openness of the international trading system. Instead, it is government subsidies for clean technology
that have come under attack, and may yet destabilize
long-standing practices and rules under the GATT/WTO
regime.
For now, interested parties would do well to pay close
attention to the proceedings in Geneva, which have the
potential to write the rules of the road for a new era in
which climate mitigation measures and world trade law
interact in increasingly complex and coordinated ways.
58
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 UNTS 186.
59
Id., Annex 1.
60
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
supra note 19, art. 3.1.
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